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ABSTRACT 
The paper proposes a synthesis between human scientists and artificial representation 
learning models as a way of augmenting epistemic warrants of realist theories against 
various anti-realist attempts. Towards this end, the paper fleshes out unconceived 
alternatives not as a critique of scientific realism but rather a reinforcement, as it rejects the 
retrospective interpretations of scientific progress, which brought about the problem of 
alternatives in the first place. By utilising adversarial machine learning, the synthesis 
explores possibility spaces of available evidence for unconceived alternatives providing 
modal knowledge of what is possible therein. As a result, the epistemic warrant of 
synthesised realist theories should emerge bolstered as the underdetermination by 
available evidence gets reduced. While shifting the realist commitment away from 
theoretical artefacts towards modalities of the possibility spaces, the synthesis comes out as 
a kind of perspectival modelling. 
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1. Introduction 
Perhaps an equally relevant question could run as follows. What can artificial intelligence do 
to scientific realism? Admittedly, this latter one carries a certain adversarial sentiment, or 
even maybe an intent, to mount yet another attack showing what is wrong with scientific 
realism in either the epistemological, semantic, or metaphysical dimension (cf. Chakravartty, 
2017a). On the contrary, this paper intends to offer an answer to a very tangible argument 
against scientific realism and turn it, with an assistance of artificial intelligence, into an 
argument supporting the epistemic warrant of scientific realism. The defence against the 
counterargument comprising the case of the present paper will not entail vague prospects 
considering artificial intelligence a universal solution to every conceivable problem. 
Therefore, the paper proposes an engagement at a level allowing for applications of specific 
artificial representation learning models towards building a more resilient foundation for 
the epistemic warrants of realist scientific theories. In this regard, the paper aims at the 
issue of underdetermination of scientific theories and the related matter of unconceived 
alternatives together constituting the analysed argument against scientific realism. 
In a broader sense, the paper intends to contribute to the debate on computational 
methods acting as epistemic enhancers that extend the natural inferential abilities of human 
scientists (cf. Humphreys 2004; 2011; 2020). In his pioneering analysis, Humphreys (2004) 
showed a way in which we can reason about computational science, emphasising that the 
hybrid epistemic regime, combining human and machine elements, signals the rise of a new 
kind of epistemology. A major concern associated with computational methods lies in their 
epistemic opacity, manifested as representational opacity in the case of machine learning 
models, challenging their low-level understanding by humans (Humphreys 2020). With 
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growing generalisation capabilities of the state-of-the-art models, this is in no way surprising 
and does not prevent the hybridisation of science from going forward, as suggested by 
recent developments in several fields (cf. Radovic et al., 2018; Carleo et al., 2019). Yet the 
hybrid epistemic regime, synthesising the results of human and machine learning, affords 
new perspectives on long standing disputes in general philosophy of science, such as the 
debate between scientific realism and its challengers (e.g. Wray 2018). The paper uses this 
opportunity to put forward a different view on Stanford’s unconceived alternatives, which 
shows a way of reversing their effects on realist theories by extending human inferential 
abilities with adversarial machine learning. 
Towards this goal, the argument proceeds in the following manner. First, the paper specifies 
which kinds of underdetermination, and thus of unconceived alternatives, are amenable to 
the proposed synthesis between human scientists and artificial representation learning 
models. Second, instead of conceiving unconceived alternatives through retrospective 
interpretations of the scientific progress, the paper proposes a counterintuitive move, 
conceiving unconceived alternatives as the results of exploring possibility spaces of available 
evidence by utilising artificial representation learning. Third, the paper argues that 
adversarial machine learning produces samples from the left out regions of the possibility 
spaces thus yielding modal knowledge regarding what is possible therein. Finally, by 
consulting nascent applications in astrophysics, cosmology, and high energy physics, the 
paper relates the argument to a recently proposed program of perspectival modelling 
(Massimi, 2018). 
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2. Underdetermination of Scientific Theories and the Problem of 
Unconceived Alternatives 
Then, in consequence of the offered introduction, the following narrowing of the subject 
matter is due. In regard to the phenomenon of underdetermination, we will mostly refrain 
from any comments concerning its holist version as developed by Quine and later subsumed 
under the umbrella of the Duhem-Quine thesis (Quine, 1951, pp. 39-43). Since our proposal 
consists of a practical amendment to the process of theory building, so as to bolster the 
resulting epistemic warrants, it would still be susceptible to holist underdetermination. The 
reason for this lies in the nature of the amendment. It is designed to face the 
underdetermination by evidence bringing about a set of contending theories equally 
supported by the available observations inputting a process of theory building. Then, in the 
case of holist underdetermination occurring within the context of the totality of our 
knowledge, this amendment remains indeed toothless. In selecting among possible revisions 
of an existing theory facing recalcitrant experience, it won't be able to help because holist 
underdetermination invites chain re-evaluations of the respective total system of beliefs 
(Quine, 1951, pp. 39-40). It thus goes beyond of what Quine later (1970; 1975) considered 
to be the case of empirical underdetermination by all possible evidence yielding infinitely 
many observation conditionals because his argument for the holist case, however naturally 
related, implies also a prospect of revising the rules comprising the scientific method itself. 
As Stanford (2017) defends this position against attempts to constrain its pertinence (cf. 
Laudan, 1990), he argues that the possibility of revision applies not only to ampliative rules 
of the scientific method but to deductive principles as well. Although this radical version of 
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holist underdetermination remains contentious and outside of the amendment’s scope, we 
will use its properties to further delineate the make-up of our proposal. 
The core of the proposal consists in revising the ampliative rules of the scientific method in 
order to address the case of underdetermination by available evidence. The amendment is 
not intended to resolve the case of empirical equivalents; that is distinct theories with 
identical empirical consequences (either arising by the natural progress of the scientific 
endeavour, as in van Fraassen, 1980, or constructed artificially with the intention to show 
invariability in finding the equivalents as in Kukla, 1996). Our proposal aims at an arguably 
more severe case. It comprises the theories which, while integrating all the available 
evidence, predict different yet to be observed phenomena. We consider this latter case 
more serious because it affects not only scientific realism but also the supposed solution of 
the equivalents stalemate in terms of empirical adequacy proposed by constructive 
empiricism (van Fraassen, 1980, pp. 11-12). From this perspective, a theory remains safe as 
long as we know the alternative accounts beforehand or know the future theories would be 
exclusively empirical equivalents. Only then one can, based on some voluntary epistemic 
attitude, attribute empirical adequacy accordingly. This clarity begins to deteriorate if we 
concede that there is a pool of yet to be conceived theories whose nature as well as volume 
is presently unknown, however, congruent with the available evidence (cf. Stanford, 2006). 
As Stanford suggests, the progression of science should be thus considered a history of 
displacement of the status quo theories by unconceived alternatives equally well confirmed 
by the then available evidence (ibid.). By offering a historical account of the displacement, 
the argument is construed as recurrent, supposedly affecting the present as well the future 
of the scientific endeavour (Stanford, 2006, pp. 17-18). The epistemic warrant of a theory, 
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regardless of whether aiming at truth or empirical adequacy, then shifts to a mere 
instrumentality of achieving some practical predictive goals (cf. Stanford, 2006, pp. 24-25). 
Not unlike the previous attempts, this anti-realist position gains its viability by interpreting 
the past of the scientific endeavour, which permits it to make assertions about the future. It 
thus lends itself to direct counterarguments building on the deficiencies of the selected 
interpretation (for Stanford’s New Induction f.e. Saatsi, 2015; Mizrahi, 2016; Mizrahi, 2017). 
Various claims about selectivity and/or overreaching of the interpretation then lead to a 
conclusion that the unconceived alternatives do not affect the scientific endeavour 
indiscriminately (f.e. Magnus, 2010 for an argument about the limited impact of 
unconceived alternatives due to the equally limited use of the affected eliminative 
inferences in theory building). Realists responded by reconsidering the epistemic attitude 
towards unobservables that would enable a more discerning selectivity or minimalism in 
their commitments (Chakravartty, 2017b; Saatsi, 2015 respectively). Such a shift in the 
program’s core should better delineate the epistemic warrant of realist theories making the 
program less of a catch-all strawman for the rivals to wield freely. Stratifying the 
commitment to unobservables according to some rule (f.e. principled continuity in terms of 
causally efficacious properties as in Chakravartty, 2008 or Egg, 2014) should then safeguard 
realism against the unconceived alternatives. As some minimal core of a theory, to which 
realists ascribe the highest degree of belief, latches onto the reality firmly enough, even the 
unconceived alternatives falsifying most of the landscape would leave the core and scientific 
realism itself unshaken (cf. Chakravartty, 2008; Saatsi, 2015). 
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3. Reversing the Dynamics: Probing the Unconceived 
In sum, with respect to unconceived alternatives a realist can assume that "What you don’t 
know can’t hurt you; what matters is how we assess what we think we know now" 
(Chakravartty, 2008, pp. 157-158). The suggested solution towards the content of even our 
best theories consists in a selective commitment superseding the indefensible global 
position (Chakravartty, 2017b, p. 3391). Facing the challenge of unconceived alternatives, 
the adoption of this strategy, however prudent, represents a retreat. By this we don’t mean 
one clearing out the field for anti-realist claiming because the selectivity in commitment 
opens a way for peaceful cohabitations. The retreat lies in the assessment of what realists 
assume they don't know, or more precisely of what they are unsure of to the point of 
withdrawing the commitment to it. Swapping the global position for many selective ones, 
while dismissing unconceived alternatives, narrows the resulting theories’ epistemic 
warrants. As the present and future theories should share an approximately true core, 
scientific realism prescribes parsimony in theoretical commitments, which translates into 
narrowing of the epistemic warrants. Such a discerning establishes the continuous 
predictive success of science and the ‘No Miracles Argument’ as its explanation in terms of 
scientific realism itself (cf. Putnam, 1975, p. 73). However, if a theory should latch onto the 
reality firmly enough, maintaining a steady predictive success, it has to be unique in the 
sense that the appearance of unconceived alternatives remains improbable, or even better 
impossible. Leaving the global position for selective commitments represents one way of 
delivering such uniqueness. Adopting this strategy introduces a subtle tension to the theory 
building process. Discerning a genuine parsimony in commitment is necessary for securing 
the theory’s steady predictive success. Following this strategy further, an additional 
   
 
 8  
 
selectivity in commitment in order to avoid unconceived alternatives could place the theory 
uncomfortably close to the edge of artificial parsimony. As long as uniqueness and the 
steady predictive success remain tied together without assessing the underdetermination 
by unconceived alternatives, the tension could push the theories towards artificial 
parsimony skewing the resulting epistemic warrants. Without a way to assess theories’ 
exposure to the underdetermination by unconceived alternatives, the narrowing of the 
commitments becomes a rational strategy of theory building. The risk of artificial parsimony 
could then enter the picture permanently. One way such an outcome might actualise is if 
the ‘No Miracles Argument’ in terms of scientific realism remains the supposed cause of the 
predictive success of science without considering a framework assessing its exposure to 
unconceived alternatives (cf. Dawid, 2013, pp. 172-173). 
Pointing out the risk of artificial parsimony is only a part of the picture, as a strong 
counterargument will always entail the fall-back to a sort of causal realism (cf. Psillos, 1999, 
Chapter 12; Egg, 2014), justifying the selectivity possibly approaching artificial parsimony. 
There is, however, also the second part because, as Stanford observes, the failure to 
conceive alternatives concerns the theory building processes as enacted by human scientists 
(2006). Admitting this observation suggests that any case of underdetermination by 
unconceived alternatives emerges within some framework of ampliative rules comprising a 
particular model of the scientific method (cf. Dawid, 2013, p. 60). It might be further argued 
that any set of ampliative rules represents a systemic elaboration of human cognitive 
defaults. Considering this situation from the anthropocentric perspective, there are at any 
given time alternatives which cannot be conceived due to the underdetermination of 
scientific method by human cognitive defaults. If it was the case that we had no way of 
weakening the influence of our cognitive defaults on the ‘ladder’ of underdetermination 
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(from ampliative rules to unconceived alternatives), then selectivity in theoretical 
commitments would prevail as the only meaningful strategy. However, assuming the 
feasibility of a generative process which, while learning the available evidence, could 
produce phenomena unconceived within anthropocentric frameworks, an opportunity would 
emerge permitting to probe the possibility spaces. Stemming from other than human 
cognitive defaults, such a process would have a potential to reverse the impact of 
unconceived alternatives on the realist theory building enterprise. Instead of being pushed 
into selectivity by the past flaws of exploring the possibility spaces, an expansion or a 
further selectivity in commitment would become a deliberate choice informed by the ability 
to search for the unconceived phenomena at the theory forming stage. Unconceived 
alternatives, in the anthropocentric sense inaccessible due to human cognitive defaults, 
would be made scrutable depending on the type of applied alternatives generating 
processes. By consulting the produced alternative phenomena with a human conception of 
the corresponding possibility space, epistemic warrants would emerge consolidated, 
achieving a lesser degree of underdetermination by the available evidence. The resulting 
theoretical commitments, as well as the epistemic warrants, would reflect a synthesis of the 
generated alternative phenomena with human representations that emerges from an 
enhanced understanding of the possibility space from which originates the available 
evidence. Augmenting the set of ampliative rules in this way would then remake a portion of 
the total of unconceived alternatives into an opportunity, one reversing the retreat 
following selectivity into a possibility of theoretical commitments’ expansion. They would 
latch onto the reality more firmly, since by accounting for an additional part of the 
possibility space, the decreases in underdetermination of the resulting theories would 
acquire a more distance from the edge of artificial parsimony. 
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4. Synthesising Between Human Scientists and Artificial Representation 
Learning Models 
In a nutshell, this is what can artificial intelligence do for scientific realism. By introducing 
other than human cognitive defaults, and with them also different modalities of probing the 
possibility spaces, synthesising between human scientists and artificial representation 
learning models could decrease the level of underdetermination by available evidence. 
Producing by other means phenomena which we are unable to conceive when confronted 
with the available evidence affords a transformation of the alternatives beyond their anti-
realist interpretation. If we were able to achieve the synthesis, it would overturn the 
reductive perception of unconceived and instead accomplish solidifying of the epistemic 
warrants of realist theories against the very threat of unconceived alternatives. The 
feasibility of enhancing ampliative rules by such a synthesis co-founding generative process 
depends on whether there are artificial representation learning models with the desired 
properties. 
The key desired property is a control over empirical underdetermination of the model 
contributing to the synthesis. As a result of aiming at unconceived alternatives, the synthesis 
will remain underdetermined by the following choices. First, it will be susceptible to what 
Quine considered indeterminacy of translation (1970), as only one part of the dyad, in the 
present case a human scientist, weaves both veins of the conceived phenomena into a 
single theory. Having a precise control over empirical underdetermination of the artificial 
model, in Quine’s terms having the ability to fix its (foreigner’s) observational sentences (cf. 
1970, pp. 179-180), doesn’t rule out that there are several ways of combining both veins of 
knowledge into a coherent theory. The second choice causing underdetermination of the 
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synthesis consists in the architecture and settings of the applied artificial representation 
learning model. A proper choice from the joint parameter space of models’ architectures 
and their settings determines the key desired property, the control over models’ empirical 
underdetermination. 
As to the indeterminacy of translation, unless we abandon the notion of synthesis for 
autonomous computational discovery of knowledge producing full-fledged scientific 
theories, it will persist to cause underdetermination of the theory building. (Semi-) 
autonomous computational discovery of scientific knowledge was historically considered 
the avenue which would lead to artificial intelligence revolutionising the scientific 
endeavour and its philosophy alike (f.e. Gillies, 1996; Thagard, 1988). At first, the then 
computational state of the art merely sufficed to experimental rediscoveries of historical 
results, later leading to what can be considered novel, i.e. publishable, discoveries (Langley, 
2000). However, as far as concerning the probing of possibility spaces for unconceived 
phenomena by artificial means, it is contentious whether the field of (semi-) autonomous 
computational discovery might contribute in any substantial way. Although professing a 
human-computer cooperation as well, which might be assumed for another kind of 
synthesis, its cornerstone consists of casting knowledge in terms of anthropocentric 
formalisms typical in individual disciplines (Džeroski et al., 2007). Combined with the initial 
emphasis on rediscovering the theories conceived by human scientists in the past, the 
methodological frameworks tend chiefly toward human cognitive defaults. Augmenting the 
theory building by computational processes necessitating the communication of knowledge 
in pre-established theoretical terms renders it impractical towards the issue of 
underdetermination by unconceived alternatives. 
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This deficiency was already identified by Alai (2004) while discussing the issues which 
disqualify earlier attempts, including the approach of Simon’s group and work done in 
‘Turing’ tradition, from making genuine discoveries. Concerned with the kind of scientific 
discoveries that encourage realism, Alai considers the (computational) processes of 
induction, as proposed by Holland et al. (1986), the only viable option due to their natural 
alignment with the model-based representation of reality benefiting realism (Alai, 2004). 
Although the present-day machine learning models still do not satisfy Alai’s requirements 
for autonomous discovery, i.e. unaided goal discovery and model building in the human 
sense (cf. Alai, 2004, pp. 34-37), thanks to advances in Deep Learning we made significant 
progress in the end-to-end generalisation learning (cf. LeCun et al., 2015). The proposed 
synthesis between human and machine learning shows that extending human conceivability 
by samples from the left out regions of possibility spaces of available evidence essentially 
enriches realist theories. Finding new ways to generalise about evidence, while decreasing 
human involvement in the process (end-to-end machine learning), offers a reinforcement to 
realism even if we cannot rely on full-blown autonomous discovery machines. The hybrid 
epistemic regime of human-machine learning also agrees with the recently proposed 
functional novelty of predictions (Alai 2014), showing that despite the discovery machines 
as conceived by Holland et al. (1986) and Alai (2004) have not arrived yet, scientific realism 
can make use of the existing adversarial machine learning to pre-empt unconceived 
alternatives. 
Returning back to the issue of pre-established anthropocentric formalisms, it is the 
supposed black-box character of artificial representational learning, i.e. of machine learning 
and Deep Learning currently in particular, which makes it less appealing to scientists 
preferring clear- or grey-box modelling of the traditional automated discovery systems (cf. 
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Stolle and Bradley, 2007). Although such a reservation has its merits in general settings, in 
the context of exploring possibility spaces represents a missed opportunity to reconsider the 
unconceived alternatives’ reductive interpretation3. Admittedly, there are endemic 
concerns over the interpretation of the state-of-the-art Deep Learning models, as their 
complexity interferes with building a precise theoretical picture of their inner workings (cf. 
Zhang et al., 2017). Acknowledging this nature of contemporary artificial representation 
learning, however, doesn’t impede its application towards probing the possibility spaces for 
unconceived phenomena. As the difficulties of interpretation make its integration into the 
anthropocentric frameworks of automated discovery harder, the viability of the proposed 
synthesis depends merely on an efficacious control over empirical underdetermination of 
the contributing model. 
In sum, regarding theory building processes, the synthesis between human scientists and 
artificial representation learning models should deliver the following. Given a possibility 
space from which originates the available evidence, a generative process, while learning the 
probability distribution underlying this space, samples phenomena unconceived by human 
scientists dealing with the evidence. Accounting for these phenomena in the constructed 
theory should lessen underdetermination of the result by so far unconceived theories. As 
the possibility space of available evidence becomes better mapped, the synthesis raises 
confidence in the resulting theory, making it less prone to underdetermination by 
unconceived alternatives. In other words, the subsequent emergence of a different theory 
 
3 It’s also perhaps a bit unfortunate that contemporary reviews of automated discovery adhere to somewhat 
dated typologies of artificial intelligence applications within science (f.e. Giza, 2017). Reflecting for the most 
part earlier results entirely omits recent successes delivered by Deep Learning, while underappreciating the 
influence of artificial representation learning on science in general (cf. ibid.). 
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fitting the available evidence while predicting novel phenomena becomes less probable. A 
part of the synthesised theory’s predictive success would then derive from the epistemic 
warrant whose realist nature gets bolstered by incorporating the phenomena sampled from 
regions of the possibility space left out by human scientists. 
4.1 Acquiring Material for the Synthesis: Sampling from the Possibility Space 
of Available Evidence 
Crucial for the success of the synthesis is that the generative process sampling from a 
possibility space can be tuned to explore its truly left out regions. It is not an entirely 
straightforward task, as the model (generative process) learning to generate phenomena 
from the possibility space easily slides to sampling from an incorrect probability distribution 
mistaking it for the one truly generating the observational evidence. Although the available 
evidence represents merely a finite sample from the true distribution, its approximation 
learnt by the model needs to evade empirical underdetermination as much as possible. 
Otherwise, generating from an inadequately fitted model, failing to approximate the 
evidence producing distribution, ceases to explore the possibility space in a useful way. 
Achieving a good approximation is difficult, since apart from synthetic evidential data, we 
don’t know the true distribution, and it is the point of the theory to hypothesise about it so 
as to reliably account for yet to be observed phenomena. Maintaining an efficacious control 
over the model’s empirical underdetermination is necessary to avoid sampling phenomena 
vindicating underdetermination of the synthesised theory. Essential to such an end is the 
ability to recognise an underdetermined generative model. As the artificial part of the 
synthesis aims at the left out regions, it is vital to identify which kind of the produced 
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phenomena doesn’t originate from them, since their presence implies an underdetermined 
generative model. 
A generative model fails at sampling from the left out regions of a possibility space if it 
merely recreates the phenomena comprising the available evidence. In such a case, this 
behaviour can be considered an extremum producing biased low variance samples 
converging in faithfulness on the original observational evidence. In some settings, such as 
learning the most salient features of the available evidence, it constitutes a sound strategy, 
as it reliably produces faithful recreations while lowering the complexity of the learnt 
representations (f.e. Kingma and Welling, 2014). However, as a method of acquiring 
material for the synthesis, which accounts for the phenomena from the left out regions, it 
comprises a self-defeating option. Without a way of assessing to what degree the samples’ 
fidelity approaches a recreation of the evidence, the synthesis would most likely yield 
further instances of empirically equivalent theories. In this sense, the generative model 
needs to correctly step beyond the available evidence to capture modalities underlying the 
possibility space thus acquiring the ability to sample unconceived phenomena from its left 
out regions. Put differently, the model must attempt to learn an approximation of the true 
distribution generating both the observational evidence as well as any phenomena 
congruent with the modalities determining the respective possibility space. A vital 
component establishing fruitful syntheses, and also the most formidable puzzle, consists in 
pushing the generative model beyond the fidelity of recreations towards high diversity 
samples while learning from a merely finite set of observational evidence. 
A possible path leading beyond synthesising empirical equivalents entails arranging the 
artificial representation learning model in an adversarial manner. Traditionally, an artificial 
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representation learning model consists of a parameter set obtained by minimising a cost 
function capturing some learning objective (cf. Goodfellow et al., 2016, pp. 149-150). Such a 
set-up doesn’t offer a straightforward solution to the puzzle of how to push the generative 
model to sample phenomena from the left out regions of a possibility space. To this end, it 
has been recently suggested that a viable strategy of acquiring samples from an 
approximation of the true distribution incorporating the left out regions involves the notion 
of adversarial learning. In its simplest form, the process of generating unconceived 
phenomena, i.e. samples from the left out regions, stems from an adversarial interaction 
between two players in terms of a minimax game (Goodfellow et al., 2014). Considering 
such a setting, each player conceived as a representation learning model attempts to 
minimise its cost function entailing both parameter sets while having a direct control only 
over its own parameters (ibid.). Theoretically, finding a Nash equilibrium of this zero-sum 
game during training of the model induces minimisation of the divergence between a learnt 
distribution and the true data generating distribution underlying the possibility space (cf. 
Goodfellow et al., 2014; Fedus et al., 2018). 
In practice, implementing such a design are two Deep Learning models, i.e. artificial neural 
networks, forming a generative adversarial model comprised of a generator and 
discriminator network assuming the role of competing adversaries (Goodfellow et al., 2014). 
The adversarial learning of the distribution approximating parameters proceeds by 
introducing the generator network to a vector of random noise which it transforms into a 
sample supposedly coming from the same distribution as the observational evidence 
(Goodfellow et al., 2014). The sample gets in turn scrutinised by the discriminator network 
estimating the probability that it originates from the generator rather than from the 
observational evidence (Goodfellow et al., 2014). As the game develops, the discriminator 
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improves its ability to distinguish between the artificially created and observed samples, 
while the generator produces increasingly convincing novel phenomena as its 
approximation of the distribution improves by further interacting with its foe, the 
discriminator. The game continues until the discriminator can no longer correctly decide the 
origin of incoming samples. Reaching this state, the generator thus fools the discriminator 
into believing that its samples come from the observational evidence rather than from its 
approximation of the true distribution underlying the corresponding possibility space. In 
such an adversarial scenario conceived as a minimax game, the generator therefore 
iteratively minimises the probability of the discriminator correctly classifying the incoming 
samples, thus supposedly converging towards the theoretical equilibrium4. 
4.2 Underfitting of Adversarial Learning Models: Yet Another Case of 
Underdetermination 
If carried out correctly, adversarial learning might assist in accessing the left out regions of 
possibility spaces so far accessible merely through narrow vistas of the presently available 
evidence. Furthermore, if such a generative model develops at least an approximately 
correct account of the underlying distribution, it would open a way for synthesising theories 
better withstanding the anti-realist charges referring to unconceived alternatives. In this 
 
4 As Goodfellow notes, since the players are neural networks, and their parameters acquired by back-
propagation of error, heuristically, to secure a non-vanishing gradient it is better to consider the generator as 
maximising the probability of the discriminator being mistaken (Goodfellow et al., 2014). This slightly changes 
the nature of the game, since it can no longer be described in terms of a single value function (ibid.). Although 
this represents a shift from describing the scenario in terms of a minimax game, it doesn’t lessen the game’s 
relevance towards the theoretical analysis of adversarial artificial representation learning. 
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respect, the yield is twofold. First, as the generator produces samples comprising the left 
out regions, it compensates for human cognitive defaults by introducing different modalities 
of probing the corresponding possibility space. Second, building on this newly gained 
exploratory capability, the synthesis also achieves a new level of understanding of the 
modalities determining what is possible within that particular space. As a result, acquiring at 
least an approximate awareness of the left out regions and the phenomena therein provides 
an opportunity to conceive theories less prone to the underdetermination caused by 
unconceived phenomena supported by the available evidence, however, disagreeing with 
the state-of-the-art theories. A part of the realist commitment could be thus invested into 
the way of getting a more comprehensive picture of the possibility spaces by sampling from 
artificially learnt approximations of the underlying probability distributions. In other words, 
in a bid to compensate for human cognitive defaults, a fragment of the commitment could 
be taken and deposited not within theoretical artefacts or acquired modalities of the 
possibility spaces but in a different approach of exploring what lies in the neighbourhood of 
available observations as delivered, for instance, by adversarial representation learning. 
In theory, then, replacing a single cost function with a collection leads to novel insights 
regarding the learning objective, as such a generative model constitutes a system of 
adversaries bound to compete while being exposed to observational evidence. Despite a 
seemingly straightforward exchange between game theory and representation learning, the 
benefits pushing the acquired samples beyond recreations should be considered the game’s 
side effects. Since the properties of the counterparts’ interaction resemble almost an 
Escherian strange loop, the discriminator shaping the generator which, feeding its results 
back, attempts to change the discriminator’s conception of observed and generated, it is 
necessary to watch out for signs of the model’s empirical underdetermination. 
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In the machine learning context, the most pertinent kind of empirical underdetermination 
corresponds to the notion of underfitting. It occurs if a learning model, arranged according 
to a certain architecture possessing a fixed representational capacity, fails to correctly 
account for the entirety of the structural pattern entailed in the data which serve as the 
model’s training input. In other words, the underfitted model fails to recover the true data 
generating distribution and instead obtains a bogus approximation that can account for only 
an arbitrary portion of the data (cf. Goodfellow et al., 2014, pp. 108-110). Such a model then 
cannot reliably generalise beyond the training input, as it failed to learn a close enough 
approximation of the underlying distribution. A generative model, which is not specifically 
designed to produce recreations, underfits the modalities of a possibility space when the 
majority of its samples manifest a low diversity gravitating towards recreations of the 
observational evidence and/or self-repetition. With respect to the adversarial learning of 
the underlying distribution, such a model suffers from mode collapses/drops stemming from 
a failure to reach the equilibrium at which the generator learns and sustains all the 
distribution’s modes implied within the available evidence (cf. Arora et al., 2017; 2018). 
Such an underfitted generative model thus cannot reliably generalise beyond the evidence, 
which hampers its sustained production of highly diverse samples coming from all the left 
out regions of the respective possibility space (cf. ibid.). 
Besides theoretical analyses, in empirical settings, as the process of reaching the equilibrium 
remains a side effect of an adversarial exchange, a certain degree of mode collapse, and 
thus of the model’s underfitting, is always present. Considering the landscape of artificial 
representation learning in general, there aren’t yet any practical methods offering universal 
guarantees of the optimal generalisation performance regarding arbitrarily large and 
complex empirical datasets. Facing real world observational evidence, the model is thus 
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expected to learn an approximation of the distribution which, however subject to a degree 
of underdetermination, proves instrumental for solving the task at hand5. Since mode 
collapses and/or drops are never total, permitting the model to consistently reach a degree 
of generalisation, it is always possible to obtain samples from some of the left out regions. 
Further experimentation with different initialisations, architectural patterns or 
representational capacity of the model’s components, in the present case of the two 
competing neural networks, then yields samples from other left out regions. In other words, 
it is nearly impossible to acquire a complete map of the possibility space at one go if it 
pertains to non-trivial observational evidence. Instead, the process is considered 
exploratory, gradually informing the theoretical synthesis through incoming samples, itself 
driven by an adversarial exchange pushing the model towards novel insights. If by then, as a 
group, the instances of the model successfully achieve generalisation regarding the existing 
evidence, theories resulting from the synthesis gain resistance against unconceived 
alternatives. Crucially, this occurs even without a retreat of theoretical commitments to 
what is possibly artificial parsimony, since at worst the samples from the left out regions 
corroborate the state-of-the-art theories. Conversely, at best, the commitment might be 
advanced, as the samples contribute to ruling out yet to be conceived theories predicting 
phenomena which would become incongruous with the state-of-the-art theories. Both gains 
 
5 The model can get also stranded in an overfitted state, arising from what is usually described as 
memorisation of the training data (observational evidence), likewise hampering its capability to generalise 
beyond the evidence. However, as it is underfitting which mostly imperils the current generative adversarial 
models, and the subject at hand comprises mainly underdetermination, a discussion of overfitting would 
diverge from the goal of the paper. 
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would derive from epistemic warrants building on the increased confidence in what is 
possible considering the recovered modalities of the respective possibility space. 
4.3 Limits of Software Intensive Science 
Even though adversarial machine learning can offer a window into the left out regions of 
possibility spaces, apart from suffering mode collapses and/or mode drops, which cause it 
to underfit the evidence, it is also subject to constraints associated with software intensive 
science (cf. Symons and Horner, 2014; Symons and Horner, 2017; Symons and Horner, 
2019). Arguably, finite knowers will exploit every opportunity to extend their cognitive 
reach. The proposed synthesis between human and machine learning expands available 
evidence by samples from the left out regions of possibility spaces. Evidence expanding 
inductive inferences provided by machine learning change the nature of human cognitive 
finitude. Machine learning-based ampliative inferences produce unconceived facts which we 
have not been able to consider due to their contingent, non law-like nature (thus pushing 
the limits of knowledge in the empirical sense, cf. Rescher, 2006, pp. 95-104). 
However, epistemic justifiability of such ampliative inferences depends not only on how well 
the generative model learns to generalise beyond the evidence, but crucially on reliability of 
the underlying software platform. Symons and Horner (2014; 2019) showed that if the 
underlying software exhibits high conditionality, its error distribution cannot be 
characterised, which leaves no room for principled reasoning about the program’s 
(software’s) reliability. Their claim relies on practical impossibility of testing a sufficient 
number of the program’s execution paths (ibid.). As a result, it is a priori out of question to 
reach a confidence level that would justify any assumption about reliability of the software 
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at hand (ibid.). The impossibility of realising a satisfactory test coverage distinguishes 
software intensive from non-software intensive science (ibid.). 
The synthesis between human and machine learning falls in the former category. It is thus 
an open question by how much we can improve epistemic warrant of realist theories while 
considering samples from generative adversarial models. Following this line of reasoning 
might even lead to a disappointing conclusion that software intensive science, utilising 
machine learning models, cannot support a convergence to the truth account associated 
with scientific inquiry, and its realist philosophy in particular6. This would diminish the thrust 
of the proposal, making it effective only as a remedy for underdetermination by available 
evidence. Crucially, the proposal could be then used by realists as well as empiricists to ward 
off the instrumentalists’ attack with unconceived alternatives (even if for empiricists this 
kind of underdetermination does not play a significant role). By being equally relevant to the 
realist and empiricist philosophy of science, the proposal would lose its exclusive support for 
the realist side of the debate. 
The paper argues that such a reading would not be entirely correct, because it omits an 
(important) qualification to the impossibility of characterising the error distribution of 
software exhibiting high conditionality. To achieve generality and objectivity, and thus to 
constitute an upper-bound on testability, the error distribution of a piece of software 
(program) depends on all inputs that can invoke its full path complexity, i.e. observing all, or 
almost all, depending on a sought for confidence interval, of the program’s execution paths. 
In their breakthrough result, and its later elaboration, Symons and Horner demonstrated 
 
6 We are indebted to John Symons for pointing out this limit of the human-machine learning synthetisation of 
(realist) scientific theories. 
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that any procedure that would reach a sufficient test coverage is provably intractable, given 
any computer program of a non-trivial conditionality. This outcome, however, has an 
interesting corollary: Beyond a trivial level of conditionality there are no a priori distinctions 
between reliability of computer programs. In theory, software intensive science, including 
the subset utilising machine learning, then succumbs to Hume’s Problem (1739/1978), 
because, a priori, we cannot justify any inductive inference about the reliability of a 
computer program exhibiting high conditionality. If there are no a priori distinctions 
regarding reliability, humans do not have any a priori guidance on whether to follow or 
avoid unconceived phenomena sampled from generative machine learning models. Our 
prior knowledge notwithstanding, we cannot a priori rule out the possibility that an 
otherwise well-behaved model will for a certain input produce a phenomenon which does 
not belong the possibility space of available evidence. It is simply because the machine 
learning model, i.e. a computer program, cannot distinguish among the consequences of all 
possible inputs, and so cannot the human developer/user due to the impossibility to achieve 
a sufficient test coverage. Even though for the model there is no difference between the a 
priori and a posteriori assumption of reliability, there is one for the humans. 
To reach generality and objectivity constitutive of an upper bound on software error 
distribution, the ‘no distinctions’ argument dismisses fortuitous conditions where inputs and 
the machine learning model generate legitimate results. Fortuitous conditions can be 
ascertained only a posteriori and never without justification provided by human scientists. 
Fortuitous conditions occur when a model, i.e. a piece of high conditionality software, fits 
the training data (i.e. evidence, in the present case fitting the learning signal provided by the 
discriminator) well enough so that it reliably interpolates beyond the evidence to sample 
unconceived phenomena from the left out regions of the possibility space. Generalisation, 
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i.e. in-distribution interpolation, depends on reliable software and can thus serve as a proxy 
to determine whether we reached fortuitous conditions or not. Therefore, if we seek to a 
posteriori dispel the ‘no distinctions’ argument, the human scientists, synthesising a (realist) 
theory based on their insights and machine samples, need to reflect on the training data 
(evidence), model, and their mutual fit with the assumptions about the target domain 
(possibility space). Without this step, the machine learning model becomes subject not only 
to difficulties identified by Symons and Horner but also to ‘No Free Lunch’ theorem 
(Wolpert, 1996). The latter applies because the weighting over targets (possibility spaces) is 
based on the distribution of erroneous inferences which cannot be a priori specified unless 
we can prove that a supposed shape of the possibility space is well-matched by a particular 
model. Due to Symons and Horner any such inferences will be contested and, moreover, 
also suffering from wrong assumptions about the uniformity between a model and the 
possibility space of available evidence. Hence there are no a priori distinctions among the 
range of applicable machine learning models, only a posteriori insights which lead to the 
following conclusion. 
In less technical terms, without human scientists, experimenting on possible variants of the 
training data (evidence), model, and their mutual fit with the assumptions about the target 
possibility space (see Section 4.2), the synthesis will be most likely unsuccessful (i.e. 
depending on epistemic luck). In this sense, Symons and Horner showed that machine 
learning models, i.e. high conditionality software, cannot a priori guarantee a fully 
autonomous convergence to the truth account associated with scientific inquiry, and its 
realist philosophy in particular. However, their argument does not preclude a version of 
software intensive science where humans intensively experiment on evidence and machine 
learning models to find uniformity with the possibility space at hand and its underlying 
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probability distribution. In other words, despite a priori objectivity and generality of the ‘no 
distinctions’ argument, it is still very much possible to find a posteriori fortuitous conditions. 
They can provide a window into possibility spaces of available evidence and extend our 
understanding by so far unconceived phenomena. 
5. Beyond Hypothetical Musings: Practical Prospects of the Synthesis 
Regarding practical realisations of the synthesis, in several fields, there are recently 
emerged applications of generative adversarial models (f.e. cf. Mustafa et al., 2017; Paganini 
et al., 2018; Albert et al., 2018), implying that its hypothesised epistemological benefits find 
their real counterparts when scientists integrate artificial representation learning into their 
methodological toolboxes. However, the synthesis’ full potential is yet to be appreciated, as 
the initial impetus for introducing generative models didn’t come from a concern for the left 
out regions but rather from an interest seeking to acquire a cheap way of simulating the 
studied phenomena. The cheapness delivered by machine learning comes in two forms of 
which the second paves the way for exploring the possibility spaces of observational 
evidence. In its first form the cheapness relates to often prohibitive computational costs of 
numerical simulations impeding experimental and theoretical developments alike (ibid.). As 
a generative model produces, at a relatively low computational cost, samples of phenomena 
difficult to observe and/or expensive to faithfully simulate, it lays the groundwork for the 
second kind of cheapness. This latter form disposes of the necessity to conceive an 
antecedent mathematical model underlying any numerical simulation. Since the multilayer 
feed-forward neural network, which constitutes adversarial models, proves to be a universal 
approximator regarding arbitrary continuous functions (Hornik et al., 1989), such prior 
model is no longer necessary. This property of neural networks increases the degree of 
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freedom from imposing an artificially parsimonious theoretical commitment at the very 
beginning of the enterprise, which would stem from choosing an ill-fitting antecedent 
model. Learning approximations of evidence generating distributions without imprinting the 
biases of preconceived models onto the resulting theory contributes to exposing the left out 
regions of possibility spaces. Avoiding antecedent models, while using adversarial learning 
to push generative models in the direction of the left out regions, might thus aid to deliver 
realist theories from the threat of unconceived alternatives. Consequently, the synthesis’ 
exploratory stage remains mostly unbiased, as the human cognitive inputs enter the picture 
only later on. Leaving one’s options open by relying on agnostic, i.e. model-free, universal 
approximators would postpone the commitment until scientists inspect the phenomena 
sampled from the left out regions in an effort to pre-empt unconceived alternatives. 
Arguably, quite close to a full-fledged synthesis is a recent methodological prototype 
concerned with generating weak lensing convergence maps for an instance of the ΛCDM 
cosmological model (Mustafa et al., 2017). As the model’s testing and inferring its correct 
parameters vis-à-vis our universe involves consulting generated maps pertaining to variously 
initialised instances of the standard model, the original concern was with computational 
economy allowing for agile simulations (ibid.). However, as it turned out generative 
adversarial models can in fact produce new maps congruent with an instance of the 
standard model without being ever introduced to its summary statistics apart from an 
observational exposure in the form of a limited sample of maps coming from the numerical 
simulation (ibid.). Considering the study of dark matter, energy and related phenomena, the 
generative model provides an avenue for unbiased exploration of the possibility space 
comprising observations of a universe described by the corresponding instance of the 
standard model. As the samples from such a model convey perspectives on the virtual 
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universe, the generative model delivers foremost modal knowledge about what kinds of 
cosmological structures are possible given the ΛCDM model and its instance parameters. 
Motivated by the same goal to select the best fitting physics model of the Universe, 
Zamudio-Fernandez et al., 2019 proposed to use a generative adversarial network to 
produce 3D distributions of cosmic neutral hydrogen (HI). Compared to hydrodynamic 
simulations, adversarial models can generate distributions of HI five orders of magnitude 
faster (ibid.). The increased efficiency, provided by the generalisation capability of a model 
trained on samples from the simulations, allows to survey a much larger portion of the 
possibility space of available evidence, including its left out regions. With more samples of 
HI distributions generated, the actual 21cm emissions from HI captured by radio telescopes 
can be compared to a wider range of theoretical predictions, i.e. ‘synthetic’ observables 
generated by the adversarial model (ibid.). This manoeuvre allows better utilisation of data 
coming from cosmological surveys (ibid.). However, by working with phenomena from the 
left out regions, it also adjusts the theory/model under construction to modalities of the 
possibility space of available evidence, thus lowering its exposure to unconceived 
alternatives. 
Pursuing a similar goal, Rodríguez et al., 2018 used a generative adversarial network to 
approximate distributions of matter that can be used to sample synthetic cosmic webs, 
complex networks of cosmic structures and interactions which can provide insights into dark 
matter, dark energy or laws of gravity (ibid.). Building on the work of Mustafa et al., 2017 
mentioned above, Rodríguez et al., 2018 trained the adversarial model on examples of 
cosmic webs produced by classical N-body simulations. The motivation was once again to 
remove the computational bottleneck of simulations which might prevent the full 
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realisation of cosmological surveys (ibid.). The generalisation capability of adversarial 
models can alleviate the bottleneck by making it possible to produce rich sets of theoretical 
predictions, i.e. synthetic cosmic webs, that can be compared to empirical data from the 
surveys. As in the previous experiments, cosmic webs generated by the adversarial models 
do not exhibit correlations with training data (ibid.), which indicates that they come from 
the left out regions and can be used to align the theory/model under construction with 
modalities of the possibility space of available evidence. 
Apart from astrophysics and cosmology, identically motivated attempts to reduce the costs 
of simulations are emerging in high-energy particle experiments at the Large Hadron 
Collider (LHC, de Oliveira et al., 2017; Paganini et al., 2018; Hashemi et al., 2019; Di Sipio et 
al., 2019). Paganini et al., 2018 showed that it is possible to use adversarial models to 
generate, or in the traditional sense simulate, synthetic particle showers in electromagnetic 
calorimeters. In the context of LHC’s ATLAS or CMS experiments, alleviating the 
computational bottleneck allows to encompass a wider range of theoretical assumptions 
reflected as different subatomic particle collisions and interactions (ibid.). The 
generalisation capability of adversarial models enables to sample synthetic energy 
depositions of particle showers whose diversity suggests an expanded reach into the 
possibility space of available evidence (cf. ibid.). Similarly to the cosmological experiments, 
adversarial models can be used to extend our reach to regions of the possibility space of 
available evidence that have been left out so far, ask about its modalities, and thus at least 
partially diminish the likelihood of unconceived alternatives emerging in the future. 
Finally, attempts are made to use adversarial models to produce new effective field theories 
(Erbin and Krippendorf, 2018). Erbin and Krippendorf constructed a proof-of-concept 
   
 
 29  
 
adversarial model able generate new samples from a class of supersymmetry models. The 
experiment has an epistemological significance because it implies that adversarial models 
can be applied to survey the solution space of string theory and generate new predictions 
(ibid., p. 5). Similarly to the previous empirical cases, the epistemic concern is with 
modalities of the possibility space and methods that can help to tease them out in a bid to 
pre-empt unconceived alternatives. 
Even though generative adversarial models are successfully used in other areas of science, 
with examples including generation of materials (e.g. Kim et al., 2020) or drug discovery 
(e.g. Méndez-Lucio et al., 2020), these applications do not seek modal surveys of possibility 
spaces for theoretical purposes. Their goal lies in generating new samples from a priori 
delimited regions supposedly holding new viable materials or molecules. The surveys are 
thus conditioned to stay only in the known regions of possibility spaces and serve to 
practical rather than theoretical purposes. Therefore, the parts of astrophysics, cosmology, 
and high energy physics, which start to experiment with adversarial models, are worth 
observing, for they hold a promise to begin synthesising the new breed of realist theories 
based on an extended epistemic reach of the human-machine learning nexus. Practically, 
the above outlined cases approach full syntheses, since they are only a step from applying 
the acquired knowledge to asses and possibly revise the theories’ commitments so as to 
reflect the modalities determining the possibility spaces of available evidence. In so doing, 
the theories’ exposure to unconceived alternatives would remain limited, as the modal 
knowledge of the possibility spaces helps to pre-empt yet to be observed phenomena 
possibly in conflict with the synthesised theories. 
   
 
 30  
 
Considering ramifications of such a synthesis at the meta-theoretical level, the exploration 
of possibility spaces by adversarial representation learning comes out as a kind of 
perspectival modelling (Massimi, 2018). This kinship derives from the emphasis attached to 
modal knowledge, delimiting the range of possibilities, rather than to individual phenomena 
acquired by the exploration, however important they might be for a theory at hand. Going 
for the modal dimension derived from the obtained representational content permits pre-
emptive discerning between the kinds of phenomena which might be observed in the future 
and those ruled out by a recovered modality (cf. Massimi, 2018, pp. 338-339). As a result, 
metaphysically delicate realist commitments (apart from unconceived alternatives also 
bearing in mind the issue of conceived inconsistent rivals) might be now secured even 
without the recourse to undue selectivity, as the acquired pictures of possibility spaces 
provide a framework for assessing theories’ exposure to unconceived alternatives as well 
their standing with conceived rivals. By consulting this modal dimension, while being 
engaged in realist theory building, the anti-realist’s job of hunting for the unconceived 
becomes a more demanding affair (cf. ibid.) than referring to the past flaws of exploring the 
possibility spaces. The realist could act accordingly, and instead of the backwards 
orientation embark on a forward looking quest which would, carving out the modal 
dimensions of possibility spaces, provide a new more resilient kind of the selective realist 
commitment (cf. Massimi, 2018, pp. 348-349). Finally, the question of "What can artificial 
intelligence do for scientific realism?" finds its answer in helping to facilitate the shift of 
realist commitments towards modal knowledge of possibility spaces, which would balance 
the retreats of past selectivity caused by anti-realist pressures of both kinds, those blaming 
prior missteps as well as the ones prophesying inevitability of future breakdowns. As to the 
subject of underdetermination, synthesising between human scientists and artificial 
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representation learning models would then yield theories whose epistemic warrants enjoy a 
lesser degree of underdetermination by available evidence. 
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